Central European Security after NATO and EU Enlargement
Achievements and Further Challenges
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Weitere Publikationen:
Wissenschaft & Sicherheit Studies
Wissenschaft & Sicherheit Classic
1. Introduction: An Enlarged Europe at the Beginning of the 21st Century

2. Achievements
   2.1 The End of the Power Vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe
   2.2 The Fostering of Democracy
   2.3 The Taming of Minority Conflicts

3. Further Challenges
   3.1 The Difficult Policy towards Russia
   3.2 The Difficult Policy towards Other Non-Member States
   3.3 The Formation of ESDP

4. Conclusion

5. Bibliography
1. An Enlarged Europe at the Beginning of the 21st Century

The question of NATO- and EU-enlargement could be considered as the most controversially discussed European security issue after the end of the Cold War. Now, ten years after the first NATO-enlargement towards Central and Eastern Europe and five years after the biggest enlargement wave in EU’s history, it is time to take stock of the results. What has been achieved by these enlargements? Is Europe now a more secure place? What challenges remain? Have some problems been enhanced by the enlargement? This essay tries to answer these questions by discussing the achievements and challenges of NATO- and EU-enlargement from the security perspective. Therefore, studies written during the discussions on the enlargement processes or covering them and containing assumptions and apprehensions will be considered and compared with the current situation. Furthermore, this abstract has to be regarded as a brief and basic summary with each of the covered topics deserving an own paper of at least the same length.

2. Achievements

First, the achievements of NATO- and EU-enlargement will be discussed. For a better analytical structure, the dealing with the power vacuum, the fostering of democracy and the taming of minority conflicts will be analyzed separately, but it will also be shown that they are interconnected in a way which makes a completely severed analysis impossible.

2.1 The End of the Power Vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe

Among many other scholars, Zielonka considered the Cold War as unjust, but stable.¹ The constant confrontation led to stability in the particular power blocs and made this era the longest period without any border changes in Eastern Europe.²

The disintegration of the Warsaw pact led into a power vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe. The emergence of a power vacuum at the same time led to the end of clearly defined conflict scenarios. Glaser tried to develop three scenario groups that could emerge from the lack of the hegemony of one dominant power:

1st: A direct Russian attack on Eastern or even Central Europe. However, this scenario was considered very unlikely because of Russia’s weak position after the breakdown of the Soviet Union and the big picture in world politics.

2nd: A regional war in Central and Eastern Europe. Seen in the light of the dissolution war’s in former Yugoslavia, these scenarios had to be evaluated as realistic and a lot more likely to occur than in the times of the Cold War. Furthermore, the combination of nationalist governments in many Central and Eastern European states combined with transborder minority issues provided conceivable sparks of ignition.

3rd: A major power war in Western Europe. Even though the probability for this scenario was assumed to be almost zero, a worst case scenario, in which major western powers got drawn on different sides in a regional conflict in Central and Eastern Europe could not be ruled out for 100 per cent. One of these worst case scenarios was developed by Odom and will shortly be introduced in this essay. For this scenario a Germany and Russia conscious of their power, a weak/dissoluted NATO (like demanded from some scholars) and of course the power vacuum in Central Europe would be needed: Imagine Russia offers Germany the enclave of Kaliningrad (Königsberg) in exchange for "free hand" in the "solution" of the baltic question and Germany accepts – it is presumable, that this situation could lead to a major clash in Europe with Poland perceiving itself deeply threatened and Britain and France possibly sideing with Poland. Haslam also argued that NATO as well as EU-enlargement is necessary to complete the multilateral integration of Germany in order to prevent unstable constellations similar to the era between World War I and II.

Immediatly after the end of the Cold War scholars and politicians became aware of the problems that could derive


4) cp. ibid., p. 127


7) cp. Odom, William E., Russia's Several Seats at the Table, in: International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 74, No. 4 (Oct., 1998), p. 817.

8) cp. Haslam, Jonathan, Russia's Seat at the Table. A Place Denied or a Place Delayed?, in: International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 74, No. 1 (Jan., 1998), p. 121.
from the emerging power vacuum. The "Yellowstone Park option" ("just let it burn")\textsuperscript{9} was considered not acceptable. Otherwise, many of them were also aware of the problems that could stem from the classical solution by balance of power constructions. While Zielonka on the one hand argued that a new balance of power could stabilize Central and Eastern Europe on the long run, he on the other hand admitted that the emergence of the new balance of power would create a lot of uncertainties which would lead to instability.\textsuperscript{10}

Odom instead insisted that Russia could play the Western European states against each other if NATO stayed weak and the US left Europe, so a new highly instable balance of power game could start.\textsuperscript{11} For him, the prevention of such new balance of power struggles was the main reason for arguing in favor of NATO-expansion.\textsuperscript{12} Furthermore, Cottey brings forward the argument that a NATO-enlargement understood in this way would not lead to new dividing lines in Europe.\textsuperscript{13} According to him, only a wrongly arranged EU-enlargement could divide Europe in the long run.\textsuperscript{14}

If we compare today’s situation with the situation before NATO- and EU-enlargement, it can clearly be stated that the question of the power vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe is solved by the integration of these countries in a collective security system. Therefore, the security development in Europe became again predictable to a very high degree. This has to be considered as the first (and maybe most important) achievement of the integration of Central and Eastern European states into Western European systems.

2.2 The Fostering of Democracy

The breakdown of communism and the emergence of democracies in Central and Eastern European countries fostered hope for sustainable stability of Europe in the West because of the fact that democracies are less likely to go to war.\textsuperscript{15} Otherwise, Chalmers stated already in 1993 that these young democracies could fall again under the pressure of emerging nationalism.\textsuperscript{16} Keeping in mind the breakdown of democracies in Central Europe in the time between World War I and II, this scenario seemed to be pessimistic, but not unrealistic.\textsuperscript{17}
Hence the clear additional advantage of the integrational approach compared with other approaches to solve the power vacuum question (e.g. the strengthening of the OSCE, like argued by Chalmers18) showed up: The Central European states clearly wished to join NATO and EU19 and membership to new organisations could be linked to the fullfillment of certain pre-conditions. Therefore, through the integrational approach, the power vacuum question could be solved and democracy could be fostered.

Even though it took a long time to the actual EU-enlargement, the basic criteria for the accession to EU have been established already in June 1993 in Copenhagen: States had to be stable democracies respecting human rights and protecting minorities, should have robust market economies and were expected to share the burdens of a membership.20

Bases upon this criteria, the long and complicated enlargement process of the EU started and was highlighted by the biggest EU-enlargement in its history in 2004.

In respect of NATO, the publishing of the NATO study on enlargement in 1995 can be considered as most important for the answer of the question how NATO should have been enlarged.21 On the basis of this study the concrete criteria for the enlargement have been developed: States that wanted to join NATO had to be democracies with market economies, with civil control over the military structure, good relations to their neighbours and the ability to contribute to the collective defence.22

Furthermore, NATO assisted applicant states especially in modernizing their militaries and in the development of civil structures to control and coordinate the military.23 One example for this is the Rose-Roth programme that aimed explicitly for the strenghtening of parliamentary systems by organizing workshops and seminars for civilian and military leaders.24 Compared to EU-enlargement, NATO-enlargement was stepwise: 1999 with the accession of Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary, as well as Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Romenia, Slovenia and Slovakia in 2004.25

Probably the biggest advantage for the fostering of democracy in Central and Eastern Europe was the fact that NATO and EU existed at the same time, so a kind of


19) cp. Haslam, Jonathan, Russia’s Seat at the Table. A Place Denied or a Place Delayed?, in: International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 74, No. 1 (Jan., 1998), p. 120.


24) cp. ibid., p. 991.

"double-tracked" strategy became possible: On the one hand, the successive NATO enlargement was used to fill the power vacuum and to "reward" countries for democratic reforms. Furthermore, the exclusion of a state from the enlargement process could be used to "punish" states for insufficient progress in democratic reforms, as it happened to Slovakia in 1999.

On the other hand, through the existence of NATO, a gradual EU-enlargement could be avoided. As Cottey argued, a progressive enlargement of the more economically orientated EU would have created new dividing lines between "haves" and "have-nots" and therefore endangered the fostering of democracy.²⁶

To sum it up, NATO and EU assistance to institution building as well as the double tracked "carrot and stick" enlargement policy had a huge impact on fostering democracy in Central and Eastern Europe and therefore improved the security situation. Because of the success of this strategy, a similar approach to the Balkan states is already implemented today.

2.2 The Fostering of Democracy

With the breakdown of the communist bloc, 14 new countries have been established in Europe.²⁷ Despite of the already discussed power vacuum, serious tensions could arise from the fact that only one of these states, the Czech Republic, was (almost) free of significant national minorities.²⁸ Furthermore, as an outbreak of violence against the Hungarian minority in Transilvania with several deaths proofed already in 1990, ethnic violence was not limited to Yugoslavia.²⁹ This incident can be regarded as the starting point of serious tensions between Hungary and Romania.³⁰ For the analysis of Central European security issues, the situations of Hungarian minorities deserve special attention: Having lost 2/3 of it’s territory due the treaty of Trianon in 1920, Hungary had to accept major Hungarian minorities in every neighbour state except Austria.³¹

Taming such minority conflicts became a major issue for the achievement of sustainable peace in Europe.

²⁶ cp. Cottey, Andrew, Central Europe after NATO Enlargement, NATO Fellowship paper, 1998, p. 3.
²⁸ cp. ibid., p. 305.
Although some authors argue that the most important efforts for the prevention of minority conflicts have been taken by the CSCE\textsuperscript{32}, this essay will keep it’s focus on NATO and EU-efforts. For the accession to NATO, states had to achieve good relations towards their neighbours, for the accession to EU, states had to establish minority protection rights. Taming such minority conflicts became a major issue for the achievement of sustainable peace in Europe. Although some authors argue that the most important efforts for the prevention of minority conflicts have been taken by the CSCE, this essay will keep it’s focus on NATO and EU-efforts. For the accession to NATO, states had to achieve good relations towards their neighbours, for the accession to EU, states had to establish minority protection rights.

As for the fostering of democracy, the "carrot and stick" accession policy worked also in this place: Hungary managed to start a reconciliation policy with it's neighbours by signing bilateral treaties with Slovakia and Romania in 1995 and 1996.\textsuperscript{33} Therefore, Hungary was rewarded by being allowed to access NATO, while Slovakia, which despite of the lack of democratic reforms also could not give a proof of minority protection rights, was excluded from the first accession wave.\textsuperscript{34} In the case of the EU, the eastern enlargement can be described as the catalyst for the establishment of the EU minority protection system.\textsuperscript{35} Nowadays, EU has established anti-discrimination-programmes to achieve equalisation of ethnical minorities within EU.\textsuperscript{36}

To sum it up, the third big achievement of the integration of the Central and Eastern European states into European institutions can be identified: By establishing a framework for minority protection rights, it was possible to eliminate the most dangerous possible spark of ignition for Central and Eastern European conflicts: minority issues.

### 3. Further Challenges

After the discussion of the security achievements of NATO- and EU-enlargement, the challenges that remain will be discussed. Again, the points are briefly reconsidered separately for a better analytical structure, but have to be considered interdependent to a certain extend.

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34) cp. ibid., p. 32.


36) cp. ibid., p. 306.
3.1 The Difficult Policy towards Russia

The policy towards Russia has always been one of the most complicated factors for (Central) European security. On the one hand, a big part of Central Europe’s population still felt threatened by Russia after the fall of the Iron Curtain, this is why their wish to join NATO could be explained to a large extend. On the other hand, NATO-enlargement was perceived in Russia as a threat and a way to exclude Russia from the new European security structure. It was even argued that the enlargement policy could end up in a new "Cold Peace".

Furthermore, Haslam took into consideration that an excluded and therefore isolated Russia is vulnerable to internal instability and could turn into a dictatorship, that would make the region even more insecure. The key dilemma of NATO enlargement was therefore that the fostering of trust in the new members was not possible without destroying trust on the Russian side.

To prevent Russian isolation, NATO and EU took an especially cooperative course towards Russia. By the NATO-Russian founding act, Russia was given a seat in Brussels. On the EU-level, a partnership and cooperation agreement was signed. Furthermore, Russia was granted access to the G7-Group. Last but not least, Russia was allowed to participate in all diplomatic groups during the Bosnia and the Kosovo crisis. Otherwise, because of these many reassurances towards Russia, the leaders of the Central European states became afraid of being treated only as "second class members" in both institutions. Furthermore, others insisted that including Russia in NATO decision-making is a big mistake.

The policy towards Russia also stayed a balancing act after the enlargements. Many questions concerning the security of Central and Eastern European states are directly connected with Russia and can lead to clashes with Western European states. As one of the most important questions the energy security has to be mentioned. Central Europe is dependent on Russian energy even more than Western Europe. Programmes like the "North Stream" – pipeline that connects Russia with Germany but bypasses Poland are regarded as a threat to Central European energy security. Otherwise the institutional framework of EU/NATO


39) cp. ibid., p. 41.

40) cp. Haslam, Jonathan, Russia's Seat at the Table. A Place Denied or a Place Delayed?, in: International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 74, No. 1 (Jan., 1998), p. 128.


45) cp. Odom, William E., Russia's Several Seats at the Table, in: International Affairs (Royal Institute of Internatioonal Affairs 1944-), Vol. 74, No. 4 (Oct., 1998), p. 815.

gives the Central and Eastern European countries a better chance to influence these policies.
To sum it up, on the one hand it has to be stated that the policy towards Russia stays one of the main issues for Central and Eastern European security even after their integration. On the other hand, the integrated structure makes the situation a lot easier and more predictable for both sides.

3.2 The Difficult Policy towards Other Non-Member States

Even though the already mentioned balancing act towards Russia is the most often discussed Central and Eastern European security issue, a similar situation applies also to other states. Special attention deserves the relations to the "buffer states" between NATO/EU and Russia, especially towards Ukraine.

Sharing a long and violent past (e.g. the expulsion of Poles in Soviet Ukraine during "Operation Vistula" in 1947), Poland and Ukraine managed to start a new reconciliation policy in the 1990s.\textsuperscript{49} The Joint Declaration on Accord and Reconciliation can be regarded the highlight of this policy.\textsuperscript{50} Thus, the result of this reconciliation policy is a new strategic partnership, which Copsey calls "the strongest bi-lateral alliance between a member state of the [European] Union and an eastern neighbour."\textsuperscript{51} Poland has a clear interest in securing its eastern borders, that means supporting an independent and sovereign Ukraine.\textsuperscript{52}

According to a survey of the Batory foundation, a majority of the Polish population favors NATO- and EU-membership of Ukraine.\textsuperscript{53} But not only in terms of the perception by the population, but also by concrete policy, Poland became one of the strongest advocates to euroatlantic integration of Ukraine.\textsuperscript{54} Considering on the other hand, that Russia is strongly opposed to the extension of any memberships to former Soviet states\textsuperscript{55} (even though it had to accept the membership of the Baltic states), this is one of the most important questions about Central European security. As for Russia, both NATO and EU try to solve this question by a balancing act that neither really in- nor excludes Ukraine. Examples herefore are Euro-Atlantic-Partnership Council for NATO\textsuperscript{56} and the European Neighbourship Agreement between EU and Ukraine.\textsuperscript{57}
Two further relations to non-member states remain also important for Central European security, but shall be only mentioned and not discussed here: the Polish-Belarussian and the Hungarian-Serbian relations. Both relations depend highly on the situation of the Polish minority in Belarus respectively the situation of the Hungarian minority in the Vojvodina region in Serbia.\textsuperscript{58}

### 3.3 The Formation of ESDP

The last Central European security topic discussed in this essay is the impact of the Central European integration on the European Security and Defence Policy. Despite of the obvious fact that a compromise between 15 states is much easier to achieve than between 27 states, the Central European states bring in very specific demands for the European Security and Defence Policy that may differ from Western European points of view.

The already discussed perceptions of Russia as threat in Central and Eastern Europe lead to the fact that the Central and Eastern European countries became the strongest advocates besides Great Britain for a strong transatlantic orientation of ESDP. This policy is fostered by Russian proposals to support the French wing that demands maximum autonomy of ESDP form US-policies. The clash between the Central and the Western European wing became visible for the first time even before the actual accession of the Central European states to the EU during the Iraq-war. While some Western European states refused to support the US-plans, Central European states supported them because of their strong interest to keep the U.S. present in Europe. This clash can also be observed in more recent questions like the issue of the US missile defence system that should be deployed (in what form ever) in Central and Eastern Europe.

Otherwise, it can definitely be stated that the Central European states are in general in favor of a common European Security and Defence Policy. All of them fully adopted the European Security Strategy into their National Security Strategies. Therefore, the ESDP is considered as major part for achieving Central European security and even though hot tempered discussion between Western and Central Europe will also take place in the future, I argue that the Central European countries are far better off with being able to implement their interests in the ESDP structure than ever in the past decades.

\textsuperscript{56} cp. Varwick, Johannes, Die NATO. Vom Verteidigungsbündnis zur Weltpolizei?, München 2008, p. 112.


\textsuperscript{60} cp. Rontoyanni, Clelia, So Far, so Good? Russia and the ESDP, International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 78, No. 4 (Oct., 2002), p. 815.


4. Conclusion

This essay tried to draw stock of the results of NATO-/EU-enlargement for (Central) European security. As it has been shown, several big achievements stand against some further challenges. Balancing these achievements (end of power vacuum, fostering of democracy and taming of minority conflicts) against the further challenges (balancing acts in policy towards Russia, Ukraine and others and the development of ESDP) and keeping in mind that these challenges would have occurred even without the enlargements, it can clearly be stated that the Eastern Enlargements have been the biggest contribution to Central European security since the end of the Cold War.

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